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In Granath v. Monroe County, 2026 NY Slip Op 01586, the New York Court of Appeals considered when a police officer driving an emergency vehicle could face civil liability after entering an intersection against a red light and colliding with another car. The case arose from a crash involving Deputy Sheriff Khadija Fong and Gary and Lorraine Granath. Because Deputy Fong was responding to another accident, the case turned on the special rules that apply to emergency vehicles under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. The Court examined whether the record showed conduct that could meet the statutory standard of reckless disregard for the safety of others.
Background Facts
The accident happened at about 5:00 p.m. on November 25, 2019, at the intersection of Ayrault Road and Turk Hill Road in Perinton. The weather was clear, the roads were dry, and there was no precipitation. Deputy Khadija Fong, along with two other officers, received a call to respond to a separate motor vehicle accident involving heavy damage and unknown injuries. Deputy Fong drove westbound on Ayrault Road. Gary and Lorraine Granath were traveling southbound on Turk Hill Road, and they had a green light as they approached the intersection.
Deputy Fong faced a red light. Because traffic occupied other westbound lanes, she moved either into a left-turn-only lane or into the lane for oncoming traffic. She slowed down, came to a stop at least once, watched northbound traffic, and waited for that traffic to yield before entering the intersection. It was undisputed that she activated her emergency lights before proceeding. The parties disputed other facts. The Granaths claimed Deputy Fong either failed to look to her right for southbound traffic or had an obstructed view. They also argued that she did not use her siren or air horn and did not call in a “Code 77” as required by department policy when deputies engaged in emergency mode.
Issue
Whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed and assumed facts failed to show that Deputy Fong acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. More specifically, the Court had to decide whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Granaths, raised a triable issue of fact on recklessness.
Holding
The Court held that summary judgment for the defendants was proper. It concluded that, even when the disputed facts were viewed in the Granaths’ favor, the evidence did not raise a triable issue as to whether Deputy Fong acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Rationale
The Court began with the summary judgment standard. A defendant moving for summary judgment had to make a prima facie showing that there were no material issues of fact. If that burden was met, the plaintiffs then had to show that factual disputes required a trial. The Court stated that it had to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Granaths because they were the nonmoving parties.
The Court then turned to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. That statute gave drivers of authorized emergency vehicles certain privileges when involved in an emergency operation. Those privileges included proceeding through a red light after slowing down as necessary for safe operation and disregarding some traffic rules about direction of movement. The Granaths did not dispute that Deputy Fong was engaged in an emergency operation and was allowed to exercise those privileges.
But those privileges were not unlimited. Under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e), an emergency vehicle driver was still responsible for conduct that showed reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court explained that this standard was much higher than ordinary negligence. To meet it, there had to be evidence that the driver intentionally engaged in conduct of an unreasonable character while disregarding a known or obvious risk so great that harm was highly probable, and did so with conscious indifference to the outcome. A lapse in judgment, standing alone, was not enough.
Applying that rule, the Court focused on what Deputy Fong did before entering the intersection. It was undisputed that she slowed down, came to a complete stop at least once, activated her emergency lights, watched northbound traffic, and waited for that traffic to yield. The Court treated those actions as important precautions. It then considered the facts the Granaths relied on. For purposes of the appeal, the Court assumed that Deputy Fong did not use her siren or air horn, did not call in a Code 77, and either failed to look to her right or had an obstructed view of southbound traffic.
Even with those assumptions, the Court ruled that the evidence did not show conscious indifference to the outcome. In the Court’s view, Deputy Fong’s decision to slow down, stop, turn on emergency lights, and wait for one direction of traffic to yield prevented the case from reaching the level of recklessness required by the statute. The Court treated the record as showing, at most, a lapse in judgment rather than the type of conduct that made harm highly probable.
The Court also addressed the plaintiffs’ argument about warning devices. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (c) required many emergency vehicles to use audible signals and display at least one red light when using the privileges listed in section 1104 (b). But police vehicles were treated differently. The statute expressly exempted police vehicles from the audible signal requirement while engaged in emergency operations. Because Deputy Fong was driving a police vehicle, the Court said her conduct had to be judged with that exemption in mind.
The Granaths also relied on Monroe County Sheriff’s Department policy, which required deputies in emergency mode to call in a Code 77 and to activate lights and sirens. The Court rejected that argument as a basis for civil liability. It stated that internal rules that went beyond the standard imposed by law could not create liability where the governing statute imposed a different standard. In other words, a violation of department policy did not by itself establish reckless disregard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104.
The Court compared the case to earlier decisions and found this record insufficient to support liability. It distinguished cases where emergency drivers ignored red lights without proper caution, failed to look, failed to use required warnings, or accelerated through intersections in a way that supported a finding of recklessness. Here, the Court concluded that the steps Deputy Fong took before entering the intersection prevented the plaintiffs from raising a triable issue.
Conclusion
The decision in Granath v. Monroe County showed how difficult it was to impose liability on the driver of an emergency vehicle under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. Even though the plaintiffs pointed to disputed facts about warnings, sight lines, and department policy, the Court held that those points did not raise a triable issue of reckless disregard when considered alongside Deputy Fong’s admitted precautions before entering the intersection. The ruling confirmed that the reckless disregard standard remained far more demanding than ordinary negligence in cases involving emergency vehicle operations.
If you were charged with an offense arising from a traffic stop, roadside encounter, or emergency response investigation, speaking with a New York car accident lawyer at Stephen Bilkis & Associates may help you understand your rights, the applicable law, and the defenses that may be available.