Car Accidents

Published on: September 13, 2012

A complainant urges, without seeming precedent, that the converse is also justified.

by Stephen Bilkis

A complainant urges, without seeming precedent, that the converse is also justified. That, when, as a matter of law, the threshold has been reached, under one or more of the definitions of the Insurance Law, that courts are under a similar obligation to remove the question of threshold compliance, from a jury’s consideration, thus, leaving only assessments of damage.

Following a concession of liability, the issue of damage was tried before the court and a jury. At the close of evidence, the accused renewed its motion to dismiss for the complainant’s failure to prove a legitimate case, in not satisfying the threshold requirements; it was denied. The court then charged four qualification definitions under the Insurance Law. The accused excepted to the charge of any definition other than the 90-180 day disability option. The complainant agreed in advance with the courts charge, and thereafter raised no exception to it. After reception of a unanimous jury verdict, for the accused, the complainant moved orally, to set aside the verdict, as being totally against the weight of the credible evidence, and that no question of fact existed as to serious injury, which should have permitted the jury to determine that the threshold requirements under the Insurance Law had not been satisfied. Post-trial memoranda were requested and received.

Specifically, there was evidence, and a concession, that the complainant, a New York City Housing Authority Police Officer was absent from work for a period of 96 days. The evidence was accompanied by the medical testimony of both a treating orthopedist and psychiatrist. Together it is contended, that this qualified the complainant’s injuries as serious, under the following definition option of the Insurance Law or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the customary daily activities for not less than ninety (90) days during the one hundred eighty (180) days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment.

Published on: September 8, 2012

Defendant Seeks Summary Judgment Arguing Complainant Didn’t Prove Serious Injury

by Stephen Bilkis

A woman moves in accordance to the Insurance Law of the State of New York for an order granting her summary judgment on the ground that the complainant man did not sustain a serious injuryin the subject accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law. The complainant opposes the woman’s motion.

The lawsuit stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by the man as a result of an automobile accident with the woman when the man’s vehicle was exiting Northern State Parkway. The man was operating a 2003 Lincoln Town Car which was owned by his employer, a car company. The woman was the owner and operator of a 2001 Chevrolet. It is alleged that the automobile that was being driven by man was struck in the rear by the automobile being driven by the woman. The man claims that the impact was heavy and caused his glasses to fly off and his body to move back and forth inside the vehicle despite the fact that he was seat belted As a result of the car accident the man claims that he sustained injuries. He commenced the action with service of a Summons and Verified Complaint.

It is well settled that the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a legitimate complaint showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact. To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must establish its claim or defense by tendering sufficient evidentiary proof, in admissible form, sufficient to warrant the court, as a matter of law, to direct judgment in the movant’s favor. Mere conclusions or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to raise a triable issue.

Published on: September 6, 2012

New York Court Determines if Plaintiff Sustained Serious Injury Pursuant to Insurance Law

by Stephen Bilkis

The action arises from a motor vehicle accident involving a collision between a 2009 BMW 328 owned by defendant Brea and operated by defendant Baez and a 2008 Honda Accord owned by defendant Salvatore J. Romano (“S. R.”) and operated by defendant Robert J. Romano (“R.R.”). Plaintiff Lutzky was a passenger in the right side backseat of defendants S.R. and R.R.’s automobile. Plaintiff Vrabel was a passenger in the front seat of defendants S.R. and R.R.’s automobile. The accident occurred at on October 25, 2009, on Meadowbrook State Parkway near its intersection with Zeckendorf Boulevard, County of Nassau, State of New York. It is alleged that at the time of the accident, the 2008 Honda Accord being operated by defendant R.R., in which plaintiffs were passengers, was traveling in the left northbound lane of the Meadowbrook State Parkway. As said vehicle was traveling straight and fully within the left lane of travel, the 2009 BMW 328, operated by defendant Baez, attempted to change lanes from the middle lane to the left lane where defendants R.R. and S.R.’s automobile was traveling. Defendant Baez attempted an abrupt and quick lane change as a result of his engagement in a race with an uninvolved black GTI vehicle. According to defendant Baez’s Examination Before Trial (“EBT”) testimony, he admits that the accident occurred as his vehicle was straddling the line located on the roadway between the middle and left lanes, while he was in the process of changing from the middle lane to the left lane. The rear left driver’s side portion of defendant Baez’s vehicle struck the front right passenger side of defendants R.R. and S.R.’s vehicle. Defendants R.R. and S.R.’s vehicle then crashed into the concrete median.

As a result of the accident, a Nassau Personal Injury Lawyer said that, plaintiff Lutzky claims that he sustained the following injuries: Scapholunate ligament tear right hand and wrist with severe pain, swelling and deformity; Right arm contusion; Swelling over the distal portion of the forearm. Whereas, plaintiff Vrabel claims that he sustained the following injuries: L5-S1 paracentral right disc herniation with contact of the right S1 nerve root as it exits the thecal sac; Mild broad bulge at L4-5; Inability to sleep; Inability to defecate without severe pain; Weight loss; Cerebral concussion; Loss of consciousness; Vomiting; Left temple ecchymosis; Severe anxiety reaction; Back pain; Neck pain; Pain and tenderness over the transverse mid abdomen; Right rib and chest pain; Left knee pain.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained due to the accident, by service of a Summons and Verified Complaint. Issue was joined by the defendants herein.

Published on: September 1, 2012

Defendant Seeks Summary Judgment Based on Plaintiff’s Failure to Prove Serious Injury

by Stephen Bilkis

The opponent’s motion seeking an order granting summary judgment pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law and dismissing the victim’s complaint on the grounds that the victim’s injuries do not satisfy the serious injury threshold requirement of Insurance Law, and thus the complaint for non-economic loss is barred by Insurance Law is determined as provided.

The victim commenced a lawsuit by filing a summons and complaint wherein the victim claimed personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on October 8, 2009 at or near the intersection of Bellmore Avenue and Sunrise Highway, county of Nassau, state of New York.

According to the victim’s deposition testimony, after the accident, the police responded to the scene, an ambulance did not arrive and the victim exited her vehicle unassisted, was not experiencing pain in any part of her body and was able to drive her vehicle from the scene to her workplace. The victim testified that she first sought medical attention because of pain in her lower back and because of headaches. X-rays were taken at Medical First Aid and chiropractic treatment was rendered by a physician within a week of the first doctor’s visit. The victim testified that she was treated by her physician regularly until the winter of 2010, then discontinued treatment with him. Thereafter, the victim received physical therapy two or three times per week for a few months then stopped treating in the summer of 2010. The victim testified that she saw an orthopedist, on three or four occasions, the last time being in 2010.